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Authorization infrastructures manage privileges and render access control decisions, 
allowing applications to adjust their behavior according to the privileges allocated to 
users. This paper describes the PERMIS role based authorization infrastructure along 
with its conceptual authorization, access control, and trust models.  PERMIS has the 
novel concept of a credential validation service, which verifies a user’s credentials prior 
to access control decision making and enables the distributed management of 
credentials. PERMIS also supports delegation of authority, thus credentials can be 
delegated between users, further decentralizing credential management. Finally, 
PERMIS supports history based decision making which can be used to enforce such 
things as separation of duties and cumulative use of resources. Details of the design and 
the implementation of PERMIS are presented along with details of its integration with 
Globus Toolkit, Shibboleth and GridShib. A comparison of PERMIS with other 
authorization and access control implementations is given, along with suggestions 
where future research and development is still needed.  
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1.   Introduction 
Policy based authorization infrastructures contain 
a number of advantages over access control lists 
and hard coded systems. They are more flexible 
and scalable, and are application independent. 
They provide facilities to manage user privileges, 
render access control decisions, and process the 
related information. Different types of policies 
may be supported, such as Credential Issuing 
Policies, Access Control Policies, Delegation 
Policies, and Credential Validation Policies. 
These policies contain the rules and criteria that 
specify how user privileges (or credentials, 
which are digitally signed assertions made by 
some authority about a user’s privileges) are 
managed and access control decisions are made. 
In the context of distributed grid systems 
spanning multiple domains, policy based 
authorization systems bring a number of specific 
advantages such as: they can control the issuing 
of credentials in one domain and allow the 
autonomous delegation of privileges between 
users. They can then separately control the 
validation of these credentials in the resource 
domain, and allow each resource owner to 
independently say who he trusts to issue which 
credentials to whom, and which access rights 
these valid credentials should have. This is an 
important feature that most grid systems today do 
not have. 
The authorization infrastructure that we have 
built is called PERMIS [1]. This paper describes 
the various components of the PERMIS 
authorization infrastructure, the conceptual 
models that lie behind them, and the standards 
that we have used. We conclude by comparing 
our work to that of others and describing some of 
the future work that still needs to be done. The 
rest of this paper is structured as follows. Section 
2 provides the conceptual models of our 
authorization infrastructure. Section 3 describes 
the design and implementation of PERMIS. 
Section 4 presents PERMIS’s integration with 
Globus Toolkit, Shibboleth and GridShib. 
Section 5 compares PERMIS to other related 
research. Section 6 concludes and indicates our 
plans for the future. 
 2.  Conceptual Models 
2.1  The Access Control and Authorization Models 
The authorization model paradigm that we have 
adopted is the well known “Subject – Action – 
Target” paradigm combined with an 
enhancement of the ISO Attribute Based Access 
Control (ABAC) model [25]. Because grids are 
distributed systems we cannot assume that all the 
attributes claimed by a user are rightfully his. 
Consequently we have enhanced ABAC so that 
subject attributes are presented as digitally 
signed credentials issued to the subject by one or 
more trusted (in the eyes of the resource owner) 
attribute authorities (AAs). A Credential 
Validation Service is introduced to validate these 
credentials and determine which of the attributes 
can rightfully be claimed by the subject. Each 
resource owner specifies the credential validation 
policies for gaining access to his resources.  
ABAC is a generalization of the well known 
role based access control (RBAC) model [18], in 
which a role is not restricted to an organizational 
role, but can be any attribute of the subject, such 
as a professional qualification or their current 
level of authentication (LoA) [23]. In the 
following discussion we will refer to roles, on the 
assumption that we mean any attribute that can 
assigned to a subject. Each subject represents a 
real world principal, which is the action 
performer. Subjects are often referred to as users, 
but they are not limited to human beings. Action 
is the operation that is requested to be performed 
on the target. It can be either a simple operation, 
or a bundle of complex operations that is 
provided as an integrated set. Target is the object 
of the action, over which the action is to be 
performed. A target represents one or more 
critical resources that need to be protected from 
unauthorized access.  
PERMIS uses the RBAC (or ABAC) model, 
in which roles are used to model organization 
roles, user groups, or any attribute of the user. 
Subjects are assigned attributes, or role 
memberships. A subject can be the member of 
zero, one or multiple roles at the same time. 
Conversely, a role can have zero, one or more 
subject occupants at the same time. In RBAC a 
role is associated with a set of privileges, where 
each privilege is the right to perform a particular 
action on a particular target. The PERMIS model 
is more flexible and allows sets of privileges to 
be assigned to sets of roles, rather than to single 
roles, since the latter is too restrictive in practice. 
For example if project managers have some 
organizational based privileges, project members 
have some project specific privileges, and project 
managers have some higher level project specific 
privileges, then without the ability to assign the 
latter to a combination of roles (project member 
and project manager), a new set of roles have to 
be specially created for each project manager. 
Thus each subject is authorised to perform the 
actions corresponding to his role memberships. 
Changing the privileges allocated to a set of roles 
will affect all subjects who are members of the 
role set (or who have been assigned the set of 
attributes). 
PERMIS supports hierarchical RBAC in 
which roles (or attributes) may be organized in a 
partial hierarchy, with some being superior to 
others. A superior role inherits all the privileges 
allocated to its subordinate roles. For example, if 
the role Staff is subordinate to Manager, then the 
Manager role will inherit the privileges allocated 
to the Staff role. A member of the Manager role 
can perform operations explicitly authorized to 
Managers as well as operations authorised to 
Staff. The inheritance of privileges from 
subordinate roles is recursive, thus a role ro will 
inherit privileges from all its direct subordinate 
roles rs, and indirect subordinate roles which are 
direct or indirect subordinate roles of rs. Role 
hierarchies need not apply only to organizational 
roles, but can apply to any attribute, such as level 
of authentication (LoA), where there is a natural 
precedence in the attribute values, in which a 
higher value implies the privileges of the lower 
values. In the LoA case, a user who has been 
authenticated to LoA value 4 (the highest) can be 
assumed to inherit the privileges assigned to the 
lower levels of authentication. 
Figure 1 shows our high level conceptual 
model for an authorization infrastructure. Step 0 
is the initialization step for the infrastructure, 
when the policies are created and stored in the 
various components. Each subject may possess a 
set of credentials from many different Attribute 
 Authorities (AAs), that may be pre-issued, long 
lived and stored in a repository or short lived and 
issued on demand, according to their Credential 
Issuing Policies. The Subject Source of Authority 
(SOA) dictates which of these credentials can 
leave the subject domain for each target domain. 
When a subject issues an application request 
(step 1), the application independent policy 
decision point (PDP) informs the application’s 
policy enforcement point (PEP) which 
credentials to include with the user’s request 
(steps 3-4). These are then collected from the 
Credential Issuing Service (CIS) or Attribute 
Repository by the PEP (steps 5-6). The user’s 
request is transferred to the target site (step 7) 
where the target SOA has already initialized the 
Credential Validation Policy that says which 
credentials from which issuing AAs are trusted 
by the target site, and the Access Control policy 
that says which privileges are given to which 
attributes. The user’s credentials are first 
validated (step 8). This may require the CVS to 
pull additional credentials from an AA’s 
repository or issuing service (step 10). The valid 
attributes are returned to the PEP (step 9), 
combined with any environmental information, 
such as current date and time (step 11), and then 
passed to the PDP for an access control decision 
(step 12). If the decision is granted the user’s 
request is allowed by the PEP (step 14), 
otherwise it is rejected. In either case, the PDP 
may also return a set of obligations, which are 
actions that the PEP must enforce along with the 
access control decision (step 13). An obligations 
service is the functional component that is 
responsible for enacting these obligations. In 
more sophisticated systems there may be a chain 
of PDPs that are called by a master PDP, with 
each PDP in the chain holding a different policy 
possibly written by a different SOA and possibly 
written in a different policy language. In this case 
the master PDP needs to hold a policy combining 
policy written by the target SOA, which 
determines the ultimate response to give to the 
PEP based on the set of granted, denied or don’t 
know responses returned by the chain of PDPs. 
Application PEPs however should be shielded 
from needing to know about this more 
sophisticated functionality. 
2.2  The Trust and Delegation Models 
Credentials are the format used to securely 
transfer a subject’s attributes/roles from the 
Attribute Authority to the recipient. They are 
also known as attribute assertions [20].  PERMIS 
only trusts valid credentials. A valid credential is 
one that has been issued by a trusted AA or his 
delegate in accordance with the current 
authorization policies (Issuing, Validation and 
Delegation policies). 
It is important to recognize the difference 
between an authentic credential and a valid 
credential. An authentic credential is one that has 
been received exactly as it was originally issued 
by the AA. It has not been tampered with or 
modified. Its digital signature, if present, is intact 
and validates as trustworthy by the underlying 
PKI, meaning that the AA’s signing key has not 
been compromised, i.e. his public key (certificate) 
is still valid. A valid credential on the other hand 
is an authentic credential that has been issued 
according to the prevailing authorization policies. 
Credential authenticity is a concern of the 
authentication system whilst credential validity is 
a concern of the authorization system. In order to 
clarify the difference, an example is the paper 
money issued by the makers of the game 
Monopoly. This money is authentic, since it has 
been issued by the makers of Monopoly. The 
money is also valid for buying houses on Mayfair 
in the game of Monopoly. However, the money is 
not valid if taken to the local supermarket 
 
Figure 1: High Level Conceptual Model of 
an Authorization Infrastructure 
 because their policy does not recognize the 
makers of Monopoly as a trusted AA for issuing 
money. Nevertheless, the money still remains 
authentic. This is a real problem in the context of 
grids today. VOMS servers [6] issue credentials 
and sign them with public key certificates issued 
by trusted grid CAs, therefore the credentials they 
issue are authentic. However without a proper 
functioning authorization system, a grid resource 
cannot tell the difference between a VOMS 
credential issued by a VOMS server managed by 
a trustworthy organization and one that has been 
quickly set up by a student who has a valid grid 
public key certificate, since both sets of VOMS 
issued credentials are authentic. 
Recognition of trusted AAs is part of 
PERMIS’s Credential Validation Policy. The 
Credential Validation Service (CVS) is the 
component that checks that each credential issuer 
is mentioned in this policy directly, or that the 
credential issuer has been delegated a privilege 
by a trusted AA either directly or indirectly (i.e. a 
recursive chain of trusted issuers is dynamically 
established controlled by the Delegation Policies 
of the Target SOA and the intermediate AAs in 
the chain). The PERMIS Credential Validation 
Policy contains rules that govern which attributes 
different AAs are trusted to issue, along with a 
Delegation Policy for each AA. These rules 
separate AAs into different groups and assign 
them different rights to issue different attributes 
to different sets of subjects. Further each AA will 
have its own Credential Issuing Policy and 
Delegation Policy. PERMIS assumes that if a 
credential has been issued and signed by a 
trusted AA, then it must be conformant to the 
AA’s Issuing Policy, so this need not be checked 
any further. However, if the credential was 
subsequently delegated this may or may not have 
conformed to the original AA’s Delegation 
Policy. Therefore when the CVS validates a 
delegated credential it needs to check that it 
conforms to the AA’s delegation policy as well 
as the Target SOA’s delegation policy. This can 
only be done if the AA makes its delegation 
policy available to the CVS, which typically 
means that it must insert its policy into each 
issued credential. Current international standards 
for the format of credentials only have limited 
support for this feature at the moment. For 
example, X.509 attribute certificates [3] may 
contain a path length constraint which can be set 
by an AA to limit the length of the delegation 
chain, and a name constraints that limits who the 
delegates can be. As international standards add 
more delegation policy fields to their credential 
formats, then the PERMIS CVS will be able to 
validate that more of the AA’s delegation policy 
has been adhered to. 
The current PERMIS delegation model 
constrains delegations to a tree rather than a 
directed graph, since this simplifies the process 
of credential validation and credential 
revocation. A delegate can be given a privilege to 
either delegate to others or assert or both. Each 
AA may further constrain delegations by validity 
times and delegation chain lengths. PERMIS also 
ensures that all delegated credentials conform to 
the following delegation paradigms:  
i) an issuer cannot delegate more privileges 
than he possesses, to ensure constrained 
propagation of privileges from issuers to 
subjects, and  
ii) an issuer cannot delegate a privilege to 
himself or to a superior in the delegation 
chain, since the recipient already holds 
this privilege. The only reason an issuer 
may want to do this, would be to 
circumvent the control that he is allowed 
to delegate but not assert a privilege, and 
by delegating to himself or to a superior 
he would be allowed to remove this 
control. 
The net result of this trust model is that 
PERMIS can support multiple AAs issuing 
different sets of attributes to the same or different 
groups of users, in which each AA can have 
different delegation policies, yet the target SOA 
can specify an overall Credential Validation 
Policy that constrains which of these (delegated) 
credentials are trusted to be used to access the 
resources under his control. Originally the model 
assumed that each subject would be known by 
the same globally unique name (typically an 
X.500 distinguished name) at each AA. We now 
know this isn’t always the case, and so this may 
be addressed by providing a name mapping 
function that can map between the different 
 names of a subject in different issuing domains. 
This is the approach that is currently being 
adopted in projects such as GridShib [10] and 
Shintau [26]. 
2.3  The Coordinated Decision Making Model 
Sometimes coordination is needed between 
access control decisions. For example, in order to 
support mutually exclusive tasks (Separation of 
Duties), the PDP needs to know if the same user 
is trying to perform a second task in a set of 
mutually exclusive ones. Alternatively, if 
multiple resources are available but their use is to 
be restricted, for example, a maximum of 30GB 
of storage can be used throughout a grid, then 
each PDP needs to know what the other PDPs 
have already granted the user access to. One 
model is to use a stateful PDP, which retains 
information about previous access control 
decisions, in so called retained ADI [25]. This 
allows coordination between successive access 
control decisions in the same PDP. Extending 
this model and communicating the retained ADI 
between a set of stateful PDPs would allow 
coordinated access control decisions to be made 
by multiple distributed PDPs. However, most 
PDPs that have been built today are not stateful, 
nor do they have the ability to communicate with 
each other. Consequently an alternative model is 
to store the retained ADI in a central secure 
database that is accessible (indirectly) by all the 
PDPs, and that can be updated (indirectly) by 
them.  In this model the retained ADI is modeled 
as attributes of a Coordination object, and a 
Policy Information Point (PIP) retrieves this 
information on behalf of the PDPs. Obligations 
in the policy say how this information should be 
updated, and the Obligations service performs 
the updates on behalf of the PDPs. A fuller 
description of this model and its implementation 
in PERMIS can be found in [29]. Modifying 
PERMIS to hold retained ADI and support 
Separation of Duties policies is described in [28]. 
3.  PERMIS: A Modular Authorization 
Infrastructure 
The PERMIS authorization infrastructure is 
shown in Figure 2. The PERMIS authorization 
infrastructure provides facilities for policy 
management, credential management, credential 
validation and access control decision making. It 
is necessary for applications to intercept users’ 
requests, ask PERMIS to validate the user’s 
credentials and make an access control decision, 
and then enforce the access control decisions and 
obligations that are returned by PERMIS. 
3.1  Policy Management 
PERMIS Policies are rules and criteria that the 
decision making process uses to render decisions. 
It mainly contains two categories of rules, trust 
related rules (Credential Validation Policy) and 
privilege related rules (Access Control Policy). 
Trust related rules specify the system’s trust in 
the distributed Attribute Authorities, and which 
attributes they are allowed to assign to whom. 
Only credentials issued by trusted AAs within 
their authority will be accepted. Privilege related 
rules specify the domains of targets, the actions 
supported by the targets, the role hierarchies, the 
privileges assigned to each role and the 
conditions under which these privileges may be 
used, for example, the times of day or the 
maximum amount of a resource that may be 
requested. In terms of the RBAC model, the trust 
related rules control the user-role assignments, 
whilst the privilege related rules control the role-
privilege assignments. 
PERMIS provides a policy management tool, 
the Policy Editor [13] (see Figure 3), which users 
can use to compose and edit PERMIS policies. 
The GUI interface of the Policy Editor 
 
Figure 2: Architecture of the PERMIS 
Authorization Infrastructure 
 comprises: the subject policy window (Where 
Users Are From), the trusted AA policy window 
(User Account Administators), the user-role 
assignment policy window (Account 
Administrator Privileges), the role hierarchy 
policy window (User’s Roles), the target 
resource policy window (My Protected 
Resources), the action policy window 
(Resources’ Functions) and the role-privilege 
assignment policy window (Users’ Privileges). 
These windows provide forms for users to fill in, 
then the tool generates the corresponding 
PERMIS policy in XML. Policies can be saved 
as pure XML in text files, or the XML can be 
embedded as a policy attribute in an X.509 
Attribute Certificate (AC) [3], digitally signed 
with the policy author’s private key (held in a 
PKCS#12 file) then stored in either a local file, 
LDAP directory or WebDAV [27] repository. 
Various helpers in the Policy Editor are capable 
of retrieving subject and AA names from LDAP 
directories, and setting times and dates in the 
correct format. Authors can use the Policy Editor 
to browse the LDAP directories and WebDAV 
repositories to select existing policies to update 
them. 
3.2  Credential Management 
The Credential Management system is 
responsible for issuing and revoking subject 
credentials. The Attribute Certificate Manager 
(ACM) tool is used by administrators to allocate 
attributes to users in the form of X.509 ACs. 
These bind the issued attributes with the 
subject’s and issuer’s identities in a tamper-proof 
manner. The ACM has a GUI interface that 
guides the manager through the process of AC 
creation, modification and revocation. The 
manager can search for a user in an attached 
LDAP directory or WebDAV repository, or enter 
the DN of the user directly. There is then a 
picking list of attribute types (e.g. role, affiliation 
etc.), to which the manager can add his own 
value (e.g. project manager). There is a pop up 
calendar allowing the manager to select the dates 
between which the AC is valid, plus the option of 
adding appropriate times of day to these. Finally 
the manager can add a few standard selected 
extensions to the AC, to say whether the holder 
is allowed to further delegate or not, and if so, 
how long the delegation chain can be ("basic 
attribute constraints" extension [3]), or if the 
holder may assert the attributes or only delegate 
them to others ("no assertion" extension [4]). 
Finally, the manager must add his digital 
signature to the AC, so the GUI prompts him for 
the PKCS#12 file holding his private key and his 
password to unlock it. Once the AC is signed, the 
manager has the option of storing it in an LDAP 
directory, WebDAV repository or local filestore. 
Besides creating ACs, the ACM allows the 
manager to edit existing ACs and to revoke 
existing ACs by deleting them from their storage 
location. Note that at present revocation lists 
have not been implemented, because short 
validity times or deletion from storage have been 
sufficient to satisfy our current user 
requirements. 
The Delegation Issuing Service (DIS) is a 
web service that dynamically issues X.509 ACs 
on demand when requested to by the delegator. It 
may be called directly by an application’s PEP 
after a user has invoked the application, to issue 
short lived ACs to the application for the 
duration of the user’s task. Alternatively there is 
a http interface that lets users invoke it via their 
web browers to dynamically delegate their 
existing longer lived credentials to other users, so 
as to enable them to act on their behalf. This is 
especially powerful, as it empowers users to 
delegate (a subset of) their privileges to other 
users without any administrative involvement. 
Because the DIS is controlled by its own 
Figure 3. The PERMIS Policy Editor 
 PERMIS policy, written by the Subject SOA, an 
organization can tightly control who is allowed 
to delegate what to whom, and then leave its 
subjects to delegate as they see fit. The DIS 
stores all delegated credentials in a locally 
configured LDAP server or WebDAV repository, 
so that they can be retrieved on demand by the 
authorization system (in steps 6b and 8b). The 
DIS has a number of advantages over the ACM, 
such as: users do not need to have X.509 public 
key certificates as all issued credentials are 
signed by the DIS, delegation chains are kept to a 
maximum length of 2, and revoking a user’s 
credential does not automatically revoke any 
credentials he may have already delegated. More 
details of the DIS can be found in [2]. 
3.3  Authorization Decision Engine 
The PERMIS Authorization Decision Engine is 
responsible for credential validation and access 
control decision making. Credential validation is 
the process that enforces the trust and delegation 
model of PERMIS as described in Section 2.2, 
and ensures that only valid roles/attributes are 
attributed to users. Access control decision 
making is the process that ensures only users 
with the required attributes gain access to the 
protected resources. Together they enforce the 
enhanced ABAC model described in Section 2.1. 
The CVS extracts the subset of valid attributes 
from the set of available credentials, according to 
the Target SOA’s Credential Validation Policy. 
The PDP makes access control decisions based 
on the Target SOA’s access control policy and 
the valid attributes passed from the CVS. The 
PERMIS authorization decision engine is 
superior to conventional PDPs since it has the 
ability to validate credentials and delegation 
chains, which is not a common capability of 
conventional PDPs e.g. Sun’s XACML PDP 
[15]. Furthermore it supports history based 
decision making and multi-session separation of 
duties [28]. Figure 4 depicts the overall 
architecture of the PERMIS Authorization 
Decision Engine. It comprises five main 
components: the PDP, the CVS, the Credential 
Retriever, the Credential Decoder, and the Policy 
Parser. 
3.4  The PDP 
The PDP component is responsible for making 
access control decisions based on the valid 
attributes of the user and the Target SOA’s 
access control policy, which is a subset of the 
PERMIS policy.  
At initialization time the Target SOA’s 
PERMIS policy is read in (step 0 in Figure 2) 
and parsed by the Policy Parser so that both the 
PDP and CVS are ready to operate. Both plain 
XML policies and digitally signed and protected 
policies can be read in. The former are stored as 
text files in the local filestore whilst the latter are 
stored as X.509 policy ACs in either the local 
filestore, or the Target SOA’s entry in an LDAP 
directory or WebDAV repository. X.509 ACs are 
tamper resistant and integrity protected, whereas 
text files have to be protected by the operating 
system.  
Each time the user makes a request to the 
application to perform a task (step 1 or 7 in 
Figure 2), the PEP passes this request to the 
PERMIS PDP (step 3 or 11) along with user’s 
valid attributes and any required environmental 
attributes such as the time of day. The PEP needs 
to know which environmental attributes are 
needed by the access control policy, and since 
the PEP is application specific software, it is 
more likely that the access control policies will 
be restricted to constraints based on the 
 Figure 4: The PERMIS Authorization Decision 
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 environmental attributes that the PEP is capable 
of passing to the PDP. 
3.5 The CVS 
As described in Section 2.2, all credentials 
allocated to subjects will be validated by the 
CVS according to the Target SOA’s credential 
validation policy, which is a subset of the 
PERMIS policy. Figure 5 illustrates the detailed 
architecture of the CVS, along with the internal 
data flows and sequence of events.  
 
Figure 5: Data Flow Diagram for Credential Validation 
Service Architecture 
First of all the service is initialised by giving it 
the credential validation policy. The policy 
parsing module described in Section 3.4 is 
responsible for this. When the user activates the 
application, the target PEP requests the valid 
attributes of the subject (step 1 in Fig 4, step 8a 
in Fig 2). Between the request for attributes and 
returning them (in step 6 or 9 respectively) the 
following events may occur a number of times 
i.e. the CVS is capable of recursively calling 
itself as it determines the path in a delegation tree 
from a given credential to a trusted AA specified 
in the policy.  
The Credential Validation Policy Enforcer 
requests credentials from the Credential 
Retriever (step 2). PERMIS can operate in either 
credential pull mode or credential push mode. In 
credential push mode the application passes the 
user’s credentials along with his request to the 
target PEP (Step 7 in Fig 2) and the PEP passes 
them to the CVS. In credential pull mode, the 
credentials are dynamically pulled from one or 
more remote credential providers (these could be 
AA servers, LDAP or WebDAV repositories 
etc.) by the CVS (step 8b in Fig 2, step 2 in Fig 
4). The actual attribute request protocol (e.g. 
SAML or LDAP) is handled by the appropriate 
Credential Retriever module, whilst the 
credential format is handled by the appropriate 
Credential Decoder module. When operating in 
credential push mode, the PEP stores the already 
obtained credentials in a local Credential 
Provider repository and pushes the repository to 
the CVS, so that the CVS can operate in logically 
the same way for both push and pull modes. 
After credential retrieval, the credentials are 
passed to the Credential Decoding module (step 
3 Fig 4). From here they undergo the first stage 
of validation – credential authentication (step 4). 
Because only the Credential Decoder is aware of 
the actual format of the credentials, it has to be 
responsible for authenticating the credentials 
using an appropriate Credential Authenticator 
module. Consequently, both the Credential 
Decoder and Credential Authenticator modules 
are encoding specific modules. For example, if 
the credentials are digitally signed X.509 ACs, 
the Credential Authenticator uses the configured 
X.509 PKI to validate the signatures. If the 
credentials are XML signed SAML attribute 
assertions, then the Credential Authenticator uses 
the public key in the SAML assertion to validate 
the signature. The Credential Decoder 
subsequently discards all unauthentic credentials 
– these are ones whose digital signatures are 
invalid. Authentic credentials are decoded and 
transformed into an implementation specific 
local format that the Policy Enforcer is able to 
handle (step 5). 
The task of the Policy Enforcer is to decide if 
each authentic credential is valid (i.e. trusted) or 
not. It does this by referring to the Credential 
Validation Policy to see if the credential has been 
issued by a trusted AA or not. If it has, it is valid. 
If it has not and it is a delegated credential, the 
Policy Enforcer has to work its way up the 
delegation tree from the current credential to its 
issuer and from there to its issuer, recursively, 
until a trusted AA is located, or no further issuers 
can be found (in which case the credential is not 
trusted and is discarded). Consequently steps 2-5 
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 are recursively repeated until closure is reached 
(which, in the case of a loop in the credential 
chain, will be if the same credential is 
encountered again). Remember that in the 
general case there are multiple trusted credential 
issuers, who each may have their own Delegation 
Policies, and these must be enforced by the 
Policy Enforcer as much as is possible from what 
has been provided in the issued credentials. 
The CVS can be customized by PERMIS 
implementers, by implementing their own 
credential retrieval and decoding services and 
plugging them into PERMIS. This enables 
implementers to adopt credential formats and 
retrieval protocols that are not yet implemented 
by PERMIS, such as local proprietary formats. 
PERMIS can theoretically be customized to 
support any application specific credential 
validation requirements.  
4.  Integrating PERMIS 
4.1  Integration with GT4 
Globus Toolkit (GT) is an implementation of 
Grid software, which has a number of tools that 
make development and deployment of Grid 
Services easier [9]. One of the key features of 
this toolkit is secure communications. However, 
Globus Toolkit has limited authorization 
capabilities based on simple access control lists 
and grid mapfiles. To improve its authorization 
capabilities a Security Assertions Markup 
Language (SAML) authorization callout has been 
added.  SAML [20] is a standard designed by the 
Organization for the Advancement of Structured 
Information Standards (OASIS) to provide a 
universal mechanism for conveying security 
related information between the various parts of 
an access control system. The Open Grid Forum 
(OGF) has produced a profile of SAML for use 
in Grid authorization [19]. Consequently it is 
now possible to deploy an external authorization 
service that GT will contact to make 
authorization decisions on its behalf. A 
standalone PERMIS Authorization Service has 
been developed to provide this type of 
authorization decision to GT3 and GT4 through 
the SAML callout [8].  
PERMIS has also been integrated with GT4 
via its Java call outs to custom Policy Information 
Points (PIPs) and PDPs. In this case the PERMIS 
CVS is configured as a custom PIP and the 
PERMIS PDP is configured as a custom PDP. 
Information between the two modules is carried 
in the format of an XACML request context [14]. 
4.2 Integration with Shibboleth 
Shibboleth [21] is a cross-institutional 
authentication and authorization architecture for 
single sign on and access control of web 
resources. Shibboleth defines a protocol for 
carrying authentication information and user 
attributes from the user’s home site to the 
resource site. The resource site can then use the 
user attributes to make an access control decision 
about the user’s request. A user only needs to be 
authenticated once by the home site in order to 
visit other Shibboleth protected resource sites in 
the federation, as the resulting authentication 
token is recognized by any member of the 
federation. In addition to this, protection of the 
user’s privacy can be achieved, since the user is 
able to restrict what attributes will be released to 
the resource providers from his/her home site. 
However Shibboleth’s built in access control 
decision making based on the user’s attributes is 
simplistic in its functionality, and the 
management of the access controls is performed 
together with web server administration at the 
resource site. Furthermore, distributed 
management of credentials and dynamic 
delegation of authority are not supported. To 
rectify these deficiencies, a Shibboleth-Apache 
Authorization Module (SAAM) has been 
developed which integrates PERMIS with 
Shibboleth. SAAM plugs into Apache and 
replaces the Shibboleth authorization 
functionality with calls to the PERMIS 
authorization decision engine. A full description 
is provided in [5] 
PERMIS extends the access control model 
used in Shibboleth by introducing hierarchies of 
roles, distributed management of attributes, and 
policy controlled decisions based on dynamically 
evaluated conditions. PERMIS supports the 
existing semantics of Shibboleth attributes, but 
also allows X.509 ACs to be used instead, where 
more secure credentials are needed.  
 4.3 Integration with GridShib 
GridShib [10] provides interoperability between 
Globus Toolkit [9] and Shibboleth [21]. The 
GridShib Policy Information Point (PIP) (see 
Figure 6) retrieves a user’s attributes from the 
Shibboleth Identity Provider (IdP). The 
Distinguished Name Binder component is 
responsible for mapping the user’s DN, obtained 
by the GridShib PIP from the proxy certificate, 
into the user’s Shibboleth identity. The retrieved 
attributes are parsed and passed to the GT4 PEP 
which then feeds them to the PDP for an 
authorization decision. GridShib integrates 
Shibboleth’s attribute management functionality 
with GT4’s authorization decision making for 
Grid jobs. However, like GT4, GridShib provides 
only limited PDP functionality, which is based 
on access control lists and is not capable of 
coping with dynamically changing conditions, 
which a policy based engine is. 
 
 
Figure 6: GridShibPERMIS Integration Scheme 
 
GridShibPERMIS provides a GridShibPERMIS 
Context Handler that can be integrated with GT4 
as a Java callable PDP. The Context Handler is 
invoked by GT4 when an authorization decision 
is to be made. The Context Handler is fed with 
the user’s attributes that have been retrieved from 
the Shibboleth IdP. They are parsed and stored in 
a local Credential Provider Repository, ready to 
be accessed by the PERMIS CVS as described in 
Section 3.5. The Context Handler calls the CVS, 
which ensures that the attributes are valid 
according to the Target SOA’s policy; then calls 
the PDP, which renders an access control 
decision, and finally it returns the result to GT4.  
5.  Related Work 
Manandhar et at. [12] present an application 
infrastructure in which a data portal allows users 
to discover and access data over Grid systems. 
They propose an authorization framework that 
allows the data portal to act as a proxy and 
exercise the user’s privileges. When a user 
authenticates to the data portal, a credential is 
generated stating that the data portal is 
authorized to exercise the user’s privileges for a 
specific period. The credential is then used by the 
data portal to retrieve the user’s authorization 
tokens from various providers. When requesting 
a service from a service provider, the data portal 
presents both the credential and the authorization 
tokens. The authorization decision is then made 
by the service provider. The proposed 
infrastructure mainly focuses on the interaction 
between different systems in the Grid 
environment, with no in depth discussion about 
the access control model or the trust model. 
Credential verification is also missing from the 
discussion. 
XACML [14] defines a standard for 
expressing access control policies, authorization 
requests, and authorization responses in XML 
format. The policy language allows users to 
define application specific data types, functions, 
and combining logic algorithms, for the purpose 
of constructing complex policies. Sun’s open 
source XACML implementation [15] is a java 
implementation of the XACML 2.0 standard and 
provides most of the features in the standard. The 
XACML policy language is richer than that of 
PERMIS’s PDP policy, but XACML has not yet 
addressed the issue of credential validation and is 
only now working on dynamic delegation of 
authority [22].  
The Community Authorization Service (CAS) 
[11] was developed by the Globus team to 
improve the manageability of user authorization. 
CAS allows a resource owner to grant access to a 
portion of his/her resource to a VO (or 
community – hence the name CAS), and then let 
the community determine who can use this 
allocation. The resource owner thus partially 
delegates the allocation of authorization rights to 
the community. This is achieved by having a 
CAS server, which acts as a trusted intermediary 
between VO users and resources. Users first 
contact the CAS asking for permission to use a 
 Grid resource. The CAS consults its policy 
(which specifies who has permission to do what 
on which resources) and if granted, returns a 
digitally self-signed capability to the user 
optionally containing policy details about what 
the user is allowed to do (as an opaque string). 
The user then contacts the resource and presents 
this capability. The resource checks that the 
capability is signed by a known and trusted CAS 
and if so maps the CAS’s distinguished name into 
a local user account name via the Grid mapfile. 
Consequently the Grid mapfile now only needs to 
contain the name of the trusted CAS servers and 
not all the VO users. This substantially reduces 
the work of the resource administrator. Further, 
determining who should be granted capabilities 
by the CAS server is the task of other managers 
in the VO community, so this again relieves the 
burden on resource managers. For finer grained 
access control, the resource can additionally call a 
further routine, passing to it the opaque policy 
string from the capability, and using the returned 
value to refine the access rights of the user. 
Unfortunately this part of the CAS 
implementation (policy definition and evaluation 
routine) were never fully explored and developed 
by the Globus team. This is precisely the 
functionality that PERMIS has addressed. 
The main purpose of SPKI [16] is to provide 
public key infrastructures based on digital 
certificates without depending upon global 
naming authorities. SPKI binds local names and 
authorizations to public keys (or the hash values 
of public keys). Names are allocated locally by 
certificate issuers, and are only of meaning to 
them. SPKI allows authorizations to be bound 
directly to public keys, removing the process of 
mapping from authorization to names and then to 
public keys. SPKI supports dynamic delegation 
of authorizations between key holders, and 
allocation of authorizations to groups. Though 
SPKI can convey authorization information, it 
does not cover authorization decision making or 
access control policy issues. One can thus 
regards SPKI as an alternative format to X.509 
ACs or SAML attribute assertions for carrying 
credentials, and PERMIS could easily be 
enhanced to support this format of credential if it 
were required.  
The EU DataGrid and DataTAG projects have 
developed the Virtual Organisation Membership 
Service (VOMS) [6] as a way of delegating the 
authorization of users to managers in the VO. 
VOMS is a credential push system in which the 
VOMS server digitally signs a short lived X.509 
role AC for the VO user to embed in his proxy 
certificate and present to the resource. The AC 
contains role and group membership details, and 
the Local Centre Authorization Service (LCAS) 
[7] makes its authorization decision based upon 
the user’s AC and the job specification, which is 
written in job description language (JDL) format. 
This design is similar in concept to the CAS, but 
differs in message format and syntax. However 
what neither VOMS nor CAS nor LCAS provide 
is the ability for the resource administrator to set 
the policy for access to his/her resource and then 
let the authorization infrastructure enforce this 
policy on his/her behalf. This is what systems 
such as PERMIS and Keynote [17] provide. It 
will therefore be relatively easy to replace LCAS 
with the PERMIS decision engine, so that VOMS 
allocated role ACs can be pushed to the resource 
site for PERMIS to make the policy controlled 
authorization decisions. This is the subject of the 
current VPMan project [24]. 
KeyNote [17] is a trust management system 
that provides a general-purpose mechanism for 
defining security policies and credentials, and 
rendering authorization decisions based on them. 
KeyNote provides a language for defining both 
policies and assertions, where policies state the 
rules for security control, and assertions contain 
predicates that specify the granted privileges of 
users. KeyNote has been implemented and 
released as an open source toolkit. But KeyNote 
is not without its limitations. Keynotes policies 
and credentials are in their own proprietary 
format. KeyNote credentials have no time limit, 
and Keynote has no concept of revocation of 
credentials. Further, policies define the roots of 
trust, but the policies themselves are not signed 
and therefore have to be stored securely and are 
only locally trusted. 
6.  Conclusions 
This paper briefly presents our work on 
designing and building a modular policy based 
 authorization infrastructure. We have explained 
the conceptual models that underpin PERMIS 
and summarized the design and the 
implementation of the various functional 
components that comprise the PERMIS 
authorization infrastructure. These provide 
support for policy management, attribute 
management, and authorization decision making. 
We have provided details about our new 
conceptual component, the credential validation 
service. Finally, we have presented a comparison 
of related work, pointing out their relative 
advantages and disadvantages as compared to 
PERMIS.  
6.1  Future Work  
Obligations are actions that are required to be 
fulfilled along with the enforcement of access 
control decisions. Whilst PERMIS already 
supports obligations in its policies and will return 
them along with its access control decisions, the 
major area for research and development is 
building a general purpose application 
independent Obligations Service to form part of 
the authorization infrastructure.  
Constructing a master PDP that can 
coordinate the calling of multiple subordinate 
PDPs and can combine their varying decisions 
into one overall decision for the PEP, is another 
area for research and development.  
Finally, defining a standard mechanism for 
aggregating attributes from multiple authorities, 
where the user is known by different names at 
the different authorities, is another challenging 
avenue of research which we are currently 
undertaking in the Shintau project [26]. 
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